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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) provides the Utah Supreme
Court jurisdiction to decide this appeal.
V.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err in granting a Rule 12(b) (6)

motion to dismiss plaintiffs1 amended complaint?
2.

Did the lower court err in not following the mandate

of the Utah Court of Appeals?
3.

Did the

lower court commit reversible

error by

failing to allow a reasonable time for discovery, as directed in
the mandate

of the Lw.h

Court

of Appeals, prior

to

graining

defendant's motion to dismiss?
Each of the above issues is a question of law with no
deference to the trial court.

Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204,

398 P.2d 207 (1965); Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., Inc., 590
P.2d 1261 (Utah 1979); King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13
Utah

2d

399, 374 P.2d

254

(1962);

see generally,

Corbett v.

Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985).
A motion to dismiss is appropriate only when it appears
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any statement of facts which could be proved in support of
1

his claim.

E.g., Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First National

Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988).
An express ruling by an appellate court on issues raised
in the appeal is the law of the case and is binding on the lower
court and the parties. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
St. Paul Insurance Co.. 22 Utah 2d 70, 448 P.2d 724 (1968).
VI.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order granting Valley Mortgage
Company's (hereinafter "Valley Mortgage") motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The case involves numerous parties.

The lower court, pursuant to

Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, certified the order of
dismissal for appeal.
VII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A motion to dismiss is only appropriate when it appears
to a certainty that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under
any statement of facts which can be proved in support of its claim.
E.g., Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First National Bank, supra.
The complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and all reasonable inferences are construed in favor of
2

the plaintiff.

Arrow Industries, supra, at 396; Penrod v. Nu

Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983); Barrus v.
Wilkinson, supra at 208; Baur v. Pacific Finance Corp., 14 Utah 2d
283, 383 P.2d 397 (1963).

Applying the foregoing criteria, the

facts relevant to the issues presented for review, as alleged in
the complaint, are as follows:
1.

The appellants, Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry (the

"DeBrys") purchased a newly constructed office building located at
4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.

(R. 563, 576, 587,

1258-59, 1425.)
2.

The building was purchased from Del Bartel and Dale

Thurgood dba Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade"). Cascade constructed
the building.
3.

(See, R. 9435-38.)
The building contains numerous construction defects.

Construction of the building also violated Salt Lake County's
Building Code. Specifically, the building was constructed without
county approved building plans, without a building permit and
without numerous code required inspections having been performed.
As a result of the construction defects and code violations, the
building could not be legally occupied until approximately four
years after the Debrys purchased the building. (See, R. 9439-54.)
4.

Prior to the purchase, Valley Mortgage and Cascade

entered into a construction lending agreement.
3

Valley Mortgage

agreed to loan $300,000 to Cascade to construct the building. (R.
9506, para. 252.)
5.

Pursuant to the agreement, Valley Mortgage undertook

the following obligations, all of which are standard obligations in
the construction lending industry:
a)

Valley Mortgage was to assure that Cascade had a
building permit, county approved plans and proper
zoning,.

The

person

assigned

this

task

was

Assistant Vice President Paul Thurston.
b)

Valley Mortgage was to inspect the building every
three

months

to

assure

the

building

would

be

complete, of acceptable workmanship, and ready for
occupancy.
c)

Valley Mortgage would control disbursement of any
construction funds.
Id.

6.

To assure a source of repayment, Valley Mortgage

required Cascade to obtain lease commitments.
7.

Id. at para. 253.

To secure an additional source of repayment for the

construction loan, Valley Mortgage sought and obtained a long term
financing commitment from Beneficial Life Insurance Co. ("Beneficial Life").

As part of its agreement with Beneficial Life, Valley

4

Mortgage

agreed

to

perform

the

following

construction

duties

normally performed by construction lenders:
a)

Require completion of the building in compliance
with the county building and zoning codes;

b)

Obtain a valid permanent certificate of occupancy;

c)

Obtain

lease

commitments

or

other

sources

of

payment for the long term financing.
(R. 9507, para. 254.)
8.

Because of its status as a construction lender and

its contractual obligations to Beneficial Life and Cascade, Valley
Mortgage was in a superior position to know and undertake to determine the building's status, defects and code violations.

Valley

Mortg :re knew or should have known:
a)

The nature, number and extent of the construction
defects;

b)

The building's numerous code violations;

c)

That the building was incomplete, hazardous and not
ready for occupancy.
Id. at para. 255-56.

9.

Valley Mortgage's construction loan became due on

February 1, 1985.
1985.

Valley Mortgage extended the loan to March of

Subsequently, the lease commitments obtained by Cascade

expired.

However, when Cascade presented copies of earnest money

5

agreements signed by the DeBrys as purchasers, Valley Mortgage
extended the loan to July 1, 1985•
10.

Id. at para. 257-58.

In August of 1985, Valley Mortgage effectively took

over the project by paying contractors directly.

This is a

practice which commonly occurs among construction lenders when a
building is not complete and there are insufficient funds left to
complete the building.
11.

Id. at para. 259-60.

Valley Mortgage extended the loan once more to

October 12, 1985.

By this time, Valley Mortgage's long term loan

agreement with Beneficial Life had collapsed.

The only source of

funds to repay Valley Mortgage's construction loan was a proposed
sale to the DeBrys.
Mortgage.

All of these facts were known by Valley

Id.
12.

Valley Mortgage granted another extension of the

loan to December 12, 1985.

At this point, the building was not

complete and could not be occupied.

Furthermore, Valley Mortgage

knew there were not sufficient construction funds to complete the
building and cure the building's defects.
13.

Id. at para. 2 61.

The DeBrys were aware that Valley Mortgage was the

construction lender on the building and relied upon Valley Mortgage
to perform the duties that are customary to construction lenders,
i.e., to periodically inspect the building, to assure that the
construction proceeded from county approved plans and a building
6

permit, and not to disburse funds unless the building is timely and
satisfactorily constructed in conformance with the building plans.
Id. at 262.
14.

Valley Mortgage knew, or should have known, that the

DeBrys were relying

on it to perform

the common duties

of a

construction lender and that the DeBrys would not purchase the
building if they knew that Valley Mortgage had not performed its
duties.

Id. at 263.
15.

Valley Mortgage failed to disclose to the DeBrys

that there was no building permit, no approved plans nor had there
been adequate construction inspections.

Valley Mortgage failed to

disclose the construction defects and code violations.

Valley

Mortgage also failed to disclose that it had not performed normal
construction lender functions.
16.

Id. at 264-65.

Valley Mortgage concealed the foregoing from, the

DeBrys because:
a)

It had lost its lease commitments;

b)

It had lost its long term financing commitment from
Beneficial Life;

c)

The

DeBrys were the

sole

source

of

funds

that

Valley Mortgage was looking to to pay off its construction loan.

Valley Mortgage knew that if the

defects and code violations were ever disclosed to

7

the DeBrys, they would not complete the building
purchase transaction;
d)

Valley

Mortgage knew that the building was

complete

and

could

not

be

occupied.

not

Valley

Mortgage knew that a foreclosure proceeding would
not

generate

sufficient

construction loan.

funds

to

repay

the

It knew that Cascade could not

repay the loan.
Id. at 265.
17.

By failing to disclose existing defects and code

violations to the DeBrys prior to the closing of the building sale
transaction and by acting as a construction lender, Valley Mortgage
negligently represented to the DeBrys: a) the county had issued a
building permit; b) the building was constructed

according to

county

complete

approved

inhabitable.

plans; and

c)

the

building

was

and

All of these representations were false.

18.

Relying upon the above misrepresentations of Valley

Mortgage,

the

DeBrys

purchased

building.

The DeBrys were severely damaged.

building code defects is $3 3 3,515.

the

defective

and

hazardous

The cost of repair of

Salt Lake County required the

DeBrys to vacate the building for a period of time from early 1987
to late 1989.

The cost of alternate space was $351,604.

8

19.

The DeBrys, known by Valley Mortgage as prospective

purchasers, are in the class of persons foreseeably injured by
Valley Mortgage's negligence.
20.

(R. 9405-15.)

The DeBrys sued Valley Mortgage for fraud, negligent

misrepresentation and for negligence.
21.

Id.

Early on in this litigation, the lower court granted

Valley Mortgage's motion to dismiss the complaint.

The DeBrys

appealed.
22.

The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the decision of

the lower court. DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., No. 880225CA (Utah
App. June 19, 1989) (copy attached in Appendix). Specifically, the
Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the DeBrys could seek redress
under

theories

of

lender

liability

(negligence),

fraud

and

negligent misrepresentation. The court acknowledged that these
causes of action are fact sensitive and instructed the lower c:urt
not to consider a dismissal of the complaint until discovery
fleshed out the relevant facts. The case was remanded with leave
to amend the complaint.
23.

The court of appeals, in its opinion, cited Connor

v. Great Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447
P. 2d 609 (1968) as the standard under which a claim for lender
liability should be measured.

£d. at 4.

9

24.

On remand, appellants amended the complaint.

The

amended complaint alleged the three claims against Valley Mortgage,
recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. 9405-15.)
25.

Contrary to the ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals,

the lower court failed to allow complete discovery and hastily
dismissed the complaint for the second time. The trial court held:
a)

The DeBrys have not represented
memorandum

that

Valley

in argument

Mortgage

or

intentionally

misrepresented anything;
b)

The

DeBrys

have

not

represented

that

Valley

Mortgage engaged in any type of behavior or conduct
similar to that in Connor v. Great Western Savings
and Loan Ass'n, supra; and
c)

That Connor "is a California case and has not been
adopted by the State of Utah."
(See, Findings and Order of Dismissal of Valley
Mortgage Co.; R. 10932 at 35.)

The lower court certified the case for appeal and the DeBrys timely
appealed.

10

VIII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In the first appeal of this case, the Utah Court of
Appeals reviewed an order of dismissal and ruled that the DeBrys
could state a claim for relief under theories of fraud, negligent
misrepresentation and lender liability (negligence). The court of
appeals instructed tl

ower ^

the case "unt

* discovery has fleshed out the relevant

facts."

DeBi

adec

rt not to consider disposition of

/. Vaiiey Mortgage Co., supra, at 4-5 (hereinafter

"Valley").
On remand, the DeBrys amended the complaint to plead each
of the three claims recognized by the court of appeals. However,
instead of following the mandate and instructions of the court of
appeals, the lower court refused to allow completion of discovery
and entered a second order of dismissal.

The court's failure to

follow the mandate and instructions of the court of appeals is
reversible error.

See, e.g., Corbett v. Fitzgerald, 709 P. 2d 384

(Utah 1985).

11

POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING
A COMPLAINT THAT PLEADS THREE CLAIMS FOR RELIEF—ALL
ACCEPTED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In Valley, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that Valley
Mortgage, depending upon a fact finder's view of the evidence, may
be liable to the DeBrys under theories of fraud, negligent misrepresentation and lender liability (negligence).

Subsequently, the

DeBrys plead each of these claims. The court of appeals recognized
that each of these claims relied heavily upon the fact finder's
determination.

Instead of allowing a complete development of the

pertinent fcicts through discovery, as suggested by the court of
appeals, the trial court ruled that the complaint setting forth
these

three

claims

did

not

constituted reversible error.

state

a

cause

of

action.

This

E.g., Arrow Industries, Inc. v.

Zions First National Bank, supra.
POINT III
PRIVITY IS NOT A REQUIRED ELEMENT OF A
MISREPRESENTATION OR NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
Apparently,

one

of the

bases

for

the trial

court's

granting of the U.R.C.P. 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss was the lack of
contractual

privity

between

the

DeBrys

and

Valley

Mortgage.

However, privity is not required in a misrepresentation claim.
E.g., Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962);
12

Price-

Orem Investment Co, v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d
55 (Utah 1986)•

Nor is privity required in a negligence case.

DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983).
POINT IV
IF THE COMPLAINT IS DEFECTIVE — IT SHOULD BE
AMENDED — NOT DISMISSED
If the complaint contains some as yet undefined factual
omissions, the lower court should not have dismissed the complaint.
Instead, the lower court should have allowed the DeBrys to amend
their complaint.

E.g., Lynn v. Valentine, 19 F.R.D. 250 (S.D.N.Y.

1956).
POINT V
DISMISSAL IS PREMATURE
Utah

law does not favor the granting of

motions until discovery is complete.

dispositive

E.g., Downtown Athletic Club

v. Hormanf 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987).

In this case, the Utah

Court of Appeals instructed the lower court not to consider any
dispositive motion until discovery fleshed out the facts.

The

lower court disregarded the instructions and granted the motion to
dismiss prior to completion of discovery. This is reversible error.
E.g. , Drake v. Morris Plan Co. of Californiaf 53 Cal.App.3d 208,
125 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1975).

13

IX.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
A.

Procedural Background.
This is the second appeal to consider whether the DeBrys

would be entitled to relief under any statement of facts which
could be proved in support of their claim.

In DeBry v. Valley

Mortgage Co. , supra (the first appeal), the issue presented was
whether Valley Mortgage's motion to dismiss should be upheld. The
Utah Court of Appeals, held that it should not. The court stated:
It would be inappropriate for this court to
rule that in no circumstances and under no set
of facts could Valley Mortgage, as a construction lender, be held liable to DeBrys as subsequent purchasers of a project financed by
Valley Mortgage. Based on the foregoing, we
reverse the trial court's judgment and grant
the DeBrys leave to amend their complaint. Id.
at 5.
In so ruling, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized three
possible claims and instructed the lower court not to consider
disposition of those claims until adequate discovery disclosed all
relevant facts:
In their amended complaint, DeBrys should set
forth with particularity each cause of action
in which they seek redress, i.e., lender
liability under Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3 69, 447
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P.2d 609 (1968) fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. These causes of action are fact
sensitive, and therefore, proper disposition
may not be determined until adequate discovery
has fleshed out the relevant facts. Id. at 45. (Emphasis added.)
On remand, the DeBrys carefully plead each of the three
causes of action accepted by the Utah Court of Appeals.

Incred-

ibly, Valley Mortgage responded with another motion to dismiss.
Instead of allowing complete discovery to flesh out the facts, as
instructed by the Utah Court of Appeals, the trial court gave only
limited discovery prior to ruling on the motion.
B.

Legal Analysis.
An express ruling by an appellate court on issues raised

in the appeal is the law of the case and binding upon the parties,
the trial court and any subsequent appellate court.

Prudential

Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. St. Paul Insurance Co., supra;
Corbett v. Fitzgerald, supra; C & J Industries, Inc. v. Bailey, 669
P.2d 855 (Utah 1983); Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 107,
363 P.2d 498 (1961).
When a case is reversed and remanded with specific
instructions, the lower court is bound to follow the instructions.
Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979).
In summary, the Utah Court of Appeals in Valley specifically held there are three possible claims against Valley
15

Mortgage.

The DeBrys subsequently plead the three claims.

How-

ever, the trial court blatantly disregarded the ruling and the
instruction of the Utah Court of Appeals. The trial court refused
to recognize a cause of action specifically recognized by the court
of appeals (the Connor case, lender liability) and refused to allow
complete discovery prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss.

The

trial court's failure to follow the mandate of the Utah Court of
Appeals is reversible* error.

Hidden Meadows Development Co. v.

Mills, supra.
POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING
A COMPLAINT THAT PLEADS THREE CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
ALL ACCEPTED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
A.

Procedural Background.
Without limiting the theories the DeBrys could plead

against Valley Mortgage, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically
approved three possible claims under which Valley Mortgage might be
found liable to the DeBrys.

They are fraud, negligent misrep-

resentation and lender liability.

On remand, the DeBrys amended

their complaint to allege the three claims accepted by the Utah
Court of Appeals.

The trial court, instead of focusing on the

complaint to* determine whether it pleads any claims, attempted to
resolve the facts plead by plaintiffs and erroneously reasoned that
16

oral argument didn't reveal sufficient facts to state a claim. (R.
10934-35.)

Further, the trial court held that the Connor v. Great

Western Savings and Loan Ass'n case was not the law in Utah. Id.
The Court of Appeals had specifically referred to the Connor case
as one under which plaintiffs could state a claim.
The court then dismissed the complaint.

Valley at 4.

As set forth in Point I,

the trial court refused to follow the mandate of the court of
appeals.
B.

Legal Analysis.
1.

Introduction.

A motion to dismiss is only justified if it appears to a
certainty that a plaintiff cannot be entitled to relief under any
statement of facts which can be proven in support of its claim.
Arrow

Industries, Inc. v.

Zions First National

Bank, supra;

Freegard v. First Western National Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah
1987) . Further, the complaint must be construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and the trial court must indulge all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Arrow Industries,
Inc. v. Zions First National Bank, supra; Penrod v. Nu Creation
Creme, Inc., supra; Barrus v. Wilkinson, supra; Baur v. Pacific
Finance Corp., supra.

The complaint in this case, states a claim

for fraud, a claim for negligent misrepresentation and a claim for
lender liability.
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2.

The complaint states a claim for fraud.
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the
multifarious means which human ingenuity can
devise and are resorted to in order to gain an
advantage over another. . . . [I]t comprises
all acts, omissions and concealments involving
a breach of legal or equitable duty and
resulting damage to another. Schwartz v.
Tanner. 576 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1978). (Emphasis added.)
The elements of fraud are: 1) a false representation of

an existing material fact; 2) made knowingly or recklessly and
inducing reliance; and 3) reliance thereon to the innocent party's
detriment.

Id.

Each of the foregoing elements was properly

alleged. These allegations create a question of fact precluding a
motion to dismiss.

Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607

P.2d 798 (Utah 1980); Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557
P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976); Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981).
A claim for fraud may rest upon either intentional
misrepresentation

or

concealment

of

information.

Sucrarhouse

Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 73 (Utah 1980); Elder v.
Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963).
In the lower court, the only element Valley Mortgage said
was lacking was a duty to speak.

Whether a duty to speak exists,

cannot be determined by merely looking at the pleadings. A duty to
speak cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss. Whether a duty
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to speak exists is determined by the fact finder based upon
consideration of all the factual circumstances of the case.
[E]xcept in broad terms the law does not
attempt to define the occasions when a duty to
speak arises. On the contrary, there has been
adopted, as a leading principle, the proposition that whether a duty to speak exists is
determinable by referring to all the circumstances of the case and by comparing the facts
not disclosed with the object and end in view
by the contracting parties. Clawson, 384 P.2d
at 804.
[T]he duty [to speak] arises from a relation
of trust, from confidence, inequality of
condition and knowledge or other attendant
circumstances. . . . (Emphasis added.) Id.
Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated transaction is acting under a mistaken
belief as to certain facts is a factor in
determini. -* that a duty of disclosure is
owing. 384 P.2d at 805.
Because the lower court granted the motion to dismiss,
the fact finder cannot "refer to all the circumstances" nor compare
facts with expectations and come to a decision on the fraud issue.
The complaint alleges numerous duties requiring Valley Mortgage to
speak.

On a motion to dismiss, these allegations are accepted as

true. Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First National Bank, supra.
The allegations of the complaint satisfy the Clawson test and thus
state a cause of action. As a construction lender, Valley Mortgage
had knowledge of the building's condition superior to that of the
DeBrys.

It knew that the DeBrys were acting under the mistaken
19

belief that the building was habitable. Such allegations create a
fact question as to whether Valley Mortgage had a duty to speak.
Valley Mortgage's duty to speak also springs from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 529.

The restatement section provides:

Representation misleading because incomplete.
The representation stating the truth so far as
it goes which the maker knows or believes to
be materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or qualifying matter
is a fraudulent misrepresentation. . . .
By acting as a construction lender, Valley Mortgage
represented that the builder was acting in compliance with state
and county laws and regulations and had provided the bank with
county approved plans. However, Valley Mortgage knew that such was
not the case.

The bank also knew that the DeBrys erroneously

believed that such was the case.

Thus, another fact question is

presented as to whether the bank had a duty to speak.
In addition, a vendor of real property "is under a duty
to disclose to the vendee any concealed conditions, known to him,
which involve unreasonable danger to the health and safety of those
upon the premises and which the vendor may anticipate the vendee
may not discover." Kimberlin v. Leer. 500 P. 2d 1022, 1023-24 (Nev.
1972).

In this case, Valley Mortgage effectively took over the

project and stepped into the shoes of the vendor.
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Having stepped

into the shoes of a vendor, it had a duty to speak as a vendor and
disclose the defects and code violations to the DeBrys.
Valley Mortgage also had an affirmative duty to speak
because of the dangerous and illegal nature of the building.
Richfield Bank and Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 309 Minn. 362, 244 N.W.2d
648, 652 (1976). Where one party has knowledge that physical harm
might occur to another party, a duty to speak arises.

Or, stated

in other words, Valley Mortgage cannot silently stand by where
people may be injured.

Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of

California, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
Finally, Valley Mortgage had a duty to speak because the
complaint alleges that Valley Mortgage participated in a fraudulent
scheme.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the
tortious conduct of another, one is subject to
liability if he . . . (b) knows that the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so conduct himself. . . .
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876.
The DeBrys allege that the builder fraudulently con-

structed and sold a defective building.
1429-1443).

(R. 591-600, 1263-1275,

The DeBrys also allege that Valley Mortgage knew or

should have known the builder defendants did not have approved
plans, a building permit, and that the said defendants constructed
a defective building.

(R. 607, 1284, 1451, 1452.)
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The DeBrys

further allege that after the construction loan became delinquent,
Valley

Mortgage

concealed

the defects

and

code violations

to

encourage the closing of the sale and thereby avoid having to
foreclose the delinquent loan.

Id.

In Jeminson v. Montgomery Real Estate and Co., 396 Mich.
106, 240 N.W.2d 205 (1976), the Michigan Supreme Court denied the
lender's motion for summary judgment and allowed the purchaser to
attempt to prove that the lender was part of a scheme to defraud.
See also, Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F.Supp. 396 (N.D. 111. 1977) (a
lender may be
scheme).

liable

as an aidor or abettor to a

fraudulent

This Court should remand for a trial to allow the DeBrys

to prove Valley Mortgage's involvement in a fraudulent scheme.
3.

The complaint alleges a claim for negligent misrepresentation.
Utah recognizes a claim for making a statement without

using reasonable diligence to determine its accuracy.
known as negligent misrepresentation.

This is

Christensen v. Commonwealth

Land Title Insurance Co. , 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983); Jardine v.
Brunswick Corp. , 18 Utah 2d 378, 381, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967);
see. Research Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 690 P.2d 1130, 1132
(Utah 1984).
The elements of negligent misrepresentation are: (1) a
pecuniary interest in a transaction; (2) a superior position to
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know material facts; (3) a careless or negligent false representation; (4) reasonable reliance; and (5) damage.

Jardine v. Bruns-

wick Corp. 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1967); Ellis v. Hale, supra.
In the lower court, Valley Mortgage said it could not be
liable for negligent misrepresentation because it did not misrepresent anything to the DeBrys and because there is no contractual
or fiduciary relationship between the DeBrys and Valley Mortgage.
However, whether there is a misrepresentation is a question of
fact.

On a motion to dismiss, all fact questions are resolved in

favor of plaintiff.

The allegations are accepted as true.

Further, Valley Mortgage, in making the construction
loan, necessarily represented that the builder was a licensed
contractor constructing a building that complied with state and
county

laws.

By

concealing

the

building

defects

and

code

violations, Valley Mortgage misrepresented the building's condition
to the DeBrys.
In addition, liability for a negligent misrepresentation
is not dependent upon a contractual or fiduciary relationship
between the plaintiff and the person making the representation.
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).

It doesn't matter

whether Valley Mortgage had a contractual or fiduciary relationship
with the DeBrys.

Liability arises when the defendant is in the

business of knowing information or when it has a pecuniary interest
23

in the transaction.
present.

.Id.

In the present case, both elements are

Valley Mortgage had a pecuniary interest in the sale of

the building because its loan was to be repaid from the proceeds of
the sale.

Further, Valley Mortgage, as a construction lender, is

in the business of knowing the construction process.

For both of

these reasons, Valley Mortgage had a duty to disclose the code
violations and the building defects to the DeBrys. Its failure to
do so was a negligent misrepresentation of the building.
4.

The complaint sets forth a claim for lender liability
negligence.
The DeBrys' amended complaint set forth a claim for

negligent lender liability based upon the case of Connor v. Great
Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, supra.

The court of appeals

referred in its opinion to the Connor case as the standard for
pleading a negligent lender liability case.
Mortgage Co. , supra at 4.

DeBrv v. Valley

A motion to dismiss is almost never

granted in ci negligence case because of the factual questions
involved in a negligence claim.

E.g., Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v.

Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985); FMA Acceptance Co. v.
Leatherby Insurance Co. , 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). The facts pled
in this case clearly state a claim for negligence.
The construction loan process does not occur in a vacuum
with only th€> presence* of the lender and the owner/borrower. Other
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third parties include: (1) the general contractor; (2) subcontractors; (3) suppliers of materials; (4) the permanent financing
lender; and

(5) the purchaser.

Further, because construction

lending presents far greater risks than lending on a completed
structure, construction lenders become intimately involved in the
construction process.

G.S. Nelson, D.A. Whitman, REAL ESTATE

FINANCE LAW pp. 827-28 (2d. ed. 1985) (hereinafter "Whitman"). For
all practical purposes, the lender owns the building and controls
the project.
To assure repayment of the construction loan, Valley
Mortgage, as a construction lender, should have controlled the
construction by:
1.

Assuming

a

duty

to

inspect

the

construction.

Whitman, supra at 828.
2.

Requiring marketing studies.

Whitman, supra

at 831.
3.

Reviewing plans and specifications to make sure
that the building complied with local codes. Id.

4.

Controlling disbursements by use of the voucher
system.

The voucher system requires the lender to

disburse funds only when it is presented with bills
or vouchers for work actually done on the site.
Whitman, supra at 833.
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5.

Requiring a performance bond.

Whitman, supra at

837.
6.

Drafting numerous conditions in its loan commitment
to the borrower.

Whitman, supra at 846.

In addition, Valley Mortgage effectively became the
vendor of the property.

Valley Mortgage obtained, but then lost,

long term financing to repay its loan.

The DeBrys1 earnest money

offer was presented to Valley Mortgage and became the hope of the
bank to repay the construction loan. Valley Mortgage began paying
the contractors directly.

Finally, Valley Mortgage repeatedly

extended the construction loan to assure that the DeBrys purchased
the property.

In summary, Valley Mortgage participated in and

controlled every aspe>ct of the purchase transaction.
When construction lenders control the transaction, they
are held liable to other third-parties who are either intentionally
or negligently mislead by the lender.
For example, to protect third-party laborers or suppliers
of materials, the courts create equitable liens on the land or on
undisbursed construction loan proceeds.
under

theories

of

either

unjust

These liens are created

enrichment

or

third

party

beneficiary contract. E.g., S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. East Harlem
Pilot Block, 608 F.2d 28, 35 (2nd Cir. 1979); Irwin Concrete, Inc.
v. Sun Coast Properties, Inc., 33 Wash.App. 190, 653 P.2d 1331
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(1982); In re: Monroe County Housing Corp., Inc., 18 B.R. 741 (S.D.
Fla. 1982).

In imposing the lien, the courts frequently focus on

whether the construction lender misled the third-party claimant
causing him to continue to furnish labor or materials.

Chase

Manhattan Bank v. S/D Enterprises, Inc., 353 So.2d 131 (Fla. App.
1977) ; c.f.,

Hall's

Misc.

Ironworks,

Inc.

v.

All

Southern

Investment Co. Inc., 283 So.2d 372 (Fla. App. 1973).
The rationale for imposing the fictitious lien is that
the third-party suppliers would not have invested the materials to
the project if the suppliers were not misled by the construction
lender.
There is no logical reason why the law should protect the
third-party supplier or laborer and not protect the third-party
purchaser.

Both the supplier and the purchaser are investing

assets in the project.
lender.

Both rely upon the representations of the

Neither would spend their assets on the project if they

knew the true facts.
The courts also protect third-party property owners
against the negligent disbursement of funds by the construction
lender.

Cambridge Acceptance Corp. v. Hockstein, 102 N.J. Super.

435, 246 A.2d 138 (1968).

An example is Fikes v. First Federal

Savings & Loan Ass'n, 533 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1975).

In Fikes, the

plaintiff owned an unrecordable equitable interest in a piece of
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property.

Fikes claimed that the developers had diverted loan

disbursements to other projects during the course of construction
and did so with the lender's knowledge.

The court recognized the

validity of Fike's equitable interest.

The central issue facing

the court was whether a lender has a duty to protect the thirdparty interests of which the lender has knowledge.

Like Valley

Mortgage, the lender in Fikes argued that no such duty existed
because there was no privity of contract.

The appellate court

rejected the lenderfs contention and held that a duty existed. The
court observed that when Fikes allowed the developer to take legal
title to the property, he had a reasonable expectation that First
Federal would perform its role as a construction lender in a
conventional

manner.

If

First

Federal

had

disbursed

the

construction loan proceeds according to normal secured lending
practices, the property which Fikes had contracted to buy would
have been enhanced in value.

By failing to follow ordinary

disbursement procedures, First Federal breached its duty to Fikes.
Similarly, when the DeBrys executed an earnest money
agreement with the building owners/contractors, the DeBrys had the
reasonable expectation that Valley Mortgage would perform its role
as a construction lender in a conventional manner. The DeBrys had
a

reasonable expectcition that prior to dispursement

of loan

proceeds Valley Mortgage would: (1) require a building permit; (2)
28

review the building plans and specifications; (3) periodically
inspect the building; and (4) require proof the work was completed.
See Whitman, supra at 825-838.
If Valley Mortgage had disbursed its construction loan
proceeds in accordance with normal lending practices, the property
which the DeBrys intended to buy would have been enhanced by an
acceptable building.

Had the bank carried out the inspections

expected of it as a construction lender, it would have discovered
the code violations and building defects.
Finally, in Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan
Ass'n. supra. the California Supreme Court specifically held that
a construction lender may be liable to the purchasers for the
negligent construction of a builder.
In Connor, the California

Supreme Court listed the

following six factors to be examined in determining the extent of
the duty imposed upon the lender.
1.

The extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect plaintiff.

2.

The foreseeability of harm to him.

3.

The degree of certainty that plaintiff would suffer
injury.

4.

The

closeness

of

the

connection

between

defendant's conduct and the injuries suffered.
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the

5.

The moral blame attached to defendant's conduct.

6.

The policy of preventing future harm.

Connor, at 617.
The Utah Court of Appeals in Valley, accepted Connor as
stating the standard for a lender liability claim. Valley, supra at
4.

In the present case, no one knows how an extensive analysis of

those six factors by a fact finder would turn out. Notwithstanding
the court of appeals1 ruling, the lower court erroneously ruled, as
a matter of law, that Connor is not the law in Utah and dismissed
the claim based on negligent lender liability.
The pleadings clearly show that the DeBrys stated a claim
under Connor. Like Connor, the DeBrys are the purchasers of improved real estate. The transaction was intended to affect the DeBrys.
Further, a copy of the DeBry's earnest money offer was given to
Valley Mortgage.

Valley Mortgage knew that the DeBry's were the

prospective buyers of a defective building. This harm was clearly
foreseeable to Valley Mortgage. Similarly, it was absolutely clear
that the DeBrys would suffer injury.

Valley Mortgage knew or

should have known of the construction defects and code violations.
It knew that the building could not be completed with available
construction funds.
In addition, there is a clear connection between Valley
Mortgage's conduct and the injury suffered.
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There is also moral

blame.

Valley Mortgage, by repeatedly extending the construction

loan and concealing the defects effectively suckered the DeBrys
into purchasing a defective building just so Valley Mortgage could
be repaid and not harmed by its failure to act as a responsible
construction lender.

Finally, the policy of preventing further

harm favors the DeBrys.
In summary, the DeBrys1 complaint sets forth a claim for
lender liability negligence because:
a)

Valley Mortgage mislead the DeBrys;

b)

Valley

Mortgage

did

not

properly

the

criteria

disburse

the

construction funds;
c)

The

complaint

meets

set

forth

in

Connor, a theory accepted by the Utah Court of
Appeals.
POINT III
PRIVITY IS NOT A REQUIRED ELEMENT
OF A MISREPRESENTATION OR NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
A.

Procedural Background.
In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Valley Mortgage

argued

that

it could

not be

liable

for

its concealments

and

misrepresentations because there was no contractual privity between
it and the DeBrys.

(See generally R. 9655-69, 9755-62.)
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That is,

the DeBrys did not have a construction contract with Valley
Mortgage, nor did they have an account with Valley Mortgage.1
Similarly, Valley Mortgage also said that it could not be
held liable for negligence to the DeBrys because there was no
contractual privity between the DeBrys and Valley Mortgage.

Id.

However, contractual privity is not an element in a negligence or
misrepresentation case.

Thus, the decision of the lower court

should be reversed.
B.

Legal Analysis.
1.

Privity of contract is not an element in a fraud case.
Privity between the parties is not a required element in

a fraud case.

If a person fraudulently makes a misrepresentation

to another, with the knowledge it will be transmitted to a third
person, the third person has a cause of action for fraud. Ellis v.
Hale, supra.
2.

Privity of contract is not an element in a negligent
misrepresentation case.
The tort

of

negligent misrepresentation

is neither

derived from nor dependent upon the DeBrys having contractual
rights with Valley Mortgage:

*The relationship of a depositor to a financial institution is
a contractual one.
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Utah long ago acknowledged the tort of
negligent misrepresentation, which provides
that a party injured by reasonable reliance
upon a second party's careless or negligent
misrepresentation of a material fact may
recover damages resulting from that injury
when the second party had a pecuniary interest
in the transaction, was in a superior position
to know the material facts, and should have
reasonably foreseen that the injured party was
likely to rely upon the fact.
Privity of
contract is not a necessary prerequisite to
liability.
Price-Orem Investment Co. v.
Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55,
59 (Utah 1986). (Citations omitted).
3.

The DeBrys1 claim for negligence (lender liability) does
not require privity of contract.
Tort liability for negligence is not based upon any

contractual relationship between the parties.
As Professor Prosser has explained: "[Whereas]
[c]ontract actions are created to protect the
interest in having promises performed,"
"[t]ort actions are created to protect the
interest in freedom from various kinds of
harm. The duties of conduct which give rise
to them are imposed by law and are based
primarily upon social policy, and not
necessarily upon the will or intention of the
parties. . . . " DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.,
663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983).
The elements in a negligence case are the duty of
reasonable care, breach of the duty, proximate causation (foreseeability), injury and damage. Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah
1985).

Privity of contract is not required. In their complaint,

the DeBrys alleged each of the required elements. The DeBrys have
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stated a claim for negligence.

Therefore, it was reversible error

for the lower court to dismiss the complaint.
POINT IV
IF THE COMPLAINT IS DEFECTIVE — IT SHOULD
BE AMENDED — NOT DISMISSED
Because a motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief under any statement of facts, e.g., Valley; Arrow Industries, supra, the court should not have dismissed the complaint if
there is as yet some undefined

factual omission.

claims are, by their nature, fact sensitive.

Plaintiffs'

Valley, supra.

If

there is a fcictual omission in the pleading, the lower court should
have identified the omission and allowed the DeBrys to amend their
complaint.

E.g., Lynn v. Valentine, 19 F.R.D. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).

The trial court refused to do so.
POINT V
DISMISSAL IS PREMATURE
A.

Procedural Background.
In Valley, the Utah Court of Appeals instructed the lower

court not to consider disposition of the DeBrys1 complaint "until
discovery has fleshed out the relevant facts." Valley, supra at 45.
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Upon filing of the amended complaint, Valley Mortgage
promptly filed another Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The motion
was set for hearing on January 11, 1990.

The plaintiffs argued

that the court of appeals had instructed the trial court to allow
discovery to be completed before ruling on dispositive motions.
The court, over objection, set a hearing date on the motion to
dismiss for March 21, 1990 and stated discovery could proceed in
the interim.

Plaintiff was able to complete one deposition, but

complete discovery was not possible.

At the hearing on March 21,

1991, the lower court granted the motion to dismiss.

The only

discovery that occurred was the taking of the one deposition.
B.

Legal Analysis.
Utah law does not favor granting dispositive motions

until discovery is complete since discovery may create issues
requiring a trial.

E.g., Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740

P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987). Specifically, claims for negligence and
misrepresentation should not be disposed of until after discovery
is complete.
error.

To prematurely dismiss such claims is reversible

Drake v. Morris Plan Co. of California, 53 Cal.App.3d 208,

125 Cal. Rptr. 667, 670 (1975); Fikes v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n, supra; Christiansen v. Philcent Corp., 226 Pa.Super.
157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973).

To dismiss the claims in this case prior
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to completion of discovery was a violation of the order of the Utah
Court of Appeals.
X.
CONCLUSION
The law of the case, as set forth in the opinion of the
Utah Court of Appeals, is that Connor states the law to be applied
in Utah on the issue of lender liability. The trial court's ruling
that Connor is not the law in Utah is plain error requiring
reversal.
Construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, and
construing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor, the
amended complaint states three causes of action against Valley
Mortgage. The order of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs'
complaint must be reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings in the trial court.
DATED this (f*U

day of February, 1991.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellants

EDWARD T. WELLS
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Case No. 880255-CA
v.

FILED

Valley Mortgage Company,
et al.,
Defendant and Respondent.

. .Mte f. Noor*n
Cierio&f *>• Court
Dart Court o( Appsirfs

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
Attorneys:

Dale F. Gardiner and Robert J. Debry, Salt Lake City,
for Appellants
Roy G. Haslam and Thomas R. Grisley, Salt Lake City,
for Respondent

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme.
BILLINGS, Judge:
The trial court granted respondent Valley Mortgage
Company's ("Valley Mortgage") motion to dismiss appellant
Robert J. and Joan Debrys' ("Debrys") complaint, under Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Debrys appeal from this decision
claiming the trial court should have allowed them to amend
their complaint to cure any defects or, in the alternative, the
complaint adequately stated a claim for relief.
FACTS
We recite the facts as alleged in Debrys1 complaint.
Debrys purchased a newly constructed office building located at
4252 South 700 East in Salt Lake City, Utah, from the builder,
Cascade Enterprises ("builder"). Valley Mortgage was the
construction lender on the building and secured its loan
through a deed of trust. When the building was sold to Debrys,
the builder repaid Valley Mortgage from the sale proceeds.

F!LE COPY

After the sale, Debrys claimed to have discovered serious
construction defects in the office building. Debrys claimed
they would not have purchased the building had they known about
the defects. As a result/ Debrys filed a complaint naming
nineteen defendants including Valley Mortgage. Debrys'
complaint stated the following claim against Valley Mortgage:
In connection with [Valley Mortgage's]
activities as a construction lender,
[Valley Mortgage] was aware, or should
have been aware, that no valid building
permit was obtained for the building.
Furthermore, [Valley Mortgage] knew, or
should have known, that the required
inspections were not conducted on the
building by County officials.
[Valley Mortgage] had a duty to disclose
the true facts to plaintiffs. [Valley
Mortgage] failed to disclose the true
facts to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs allege on information and
belief that [Valley Mortgage] failed to
disclose the true facts to plaintiffs
because the construction loan was
delinquent and [Valley Mortgage] wanted to
avoid the time, cost and risk of
foreclosure proceedings.
By reason of [Valley Mortgage's] conduct
as alleged above, plaintiffs have
purchased a building that is neither
habitable nor marketable. If the contract
between plaintiffs and Cascade Enterprises
is.not rescinded, plaintiffs will be damaged in the amount of the cost "of the"
building, plus improvements, plus
interest. The exact amount of such damage
is not yet known.

880255-CA

2

0223f

Valley Mortgage moved to dismiss the complaint under Utah
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. At oral argument on Valley Mortgage's
motion and in response to contentions that Debrys had not
stated their claim in sufficient detail, Debrys requested leave
to amend their complaint to set forth their claims with greater
particularity. Although the trial court had allowed Debrys to
amend their complaint on two previous occasions in response to
motions brought by other defendants, this was Debrys1 first
request to amend their claim against Valley Mortgage. The
trial court denied Debrys* request and granted Valley
Mortgage's motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it appears
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of its claim." Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). See also Freeoard v.
First W. Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987). "In
reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, we are obliged
to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its
favor." Arrow Indus., 767 P.2d at 936. See also Penrod v. Nu
Creation .Creme,, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983); Barrus v.
Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (1965); Baur v.
Pacific Fin. Corp., 14 Utah 2d 283, 383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963).
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
Leave to amend a pleading is a matter within the broad
discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb its
determinations absent an abuse of discretion resulting in
prejudice to the party. Chadwick v. Nielson, 763 P.2d 817, 820
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d
245, 247 (Utah 1983); Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation
Qo^f 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983). In exercising its
discretion, the trial court should consider a motion to amend
"in light of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in the
interest of fairness and substantial justice." Girard, 660
P.2d at 247. See also Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486
P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971). The rule in Utah is -to allow
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amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is
this true before trial.- Gillman, 486 P.2d at 1046. See also
Tripp v. Vauohn, 746 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Moreover, a trial court "must have sufficient grounds to
apply the 'harsh and permanent remedy* of a dismissal with
prejudice." Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v.
Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(trial court abused its discretion in not allowing amendment or
granting continuance so plaintiff could include indispensable
parties). See also Bonneville Tower Condominium Management
Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah
1986) (trial court should have dismissed without prejudice for
plaintiffs' failure to join indispensable parties); Gillman,
486 P.2d at 1046-47 (trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to allow defendant to amend its answer by filing a
counterclaim).
In the instant case, the trial court denied Debrys' oral
motion to amend its complaint to allege with greater
specificity its cause of action against Valley Mortgage. The
court denied the motion and dismissed the claim against Valley
Mortgage with prejudice. This ruling was particularly harsh
because it was made in advance of trial where there was no
evidence of prejudice or undue delay in allowing Debrys to
amend its claim. Accordingly, we find the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the motion to amend. We reverse and
remand so that Debrys may amend their complaint against Valley
Mortgage.
In their amended complaint, Debrys should set forth with
particularity each cause of action in which they seek redress
i.e., lender liability under Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968), fraud, and
negligent misrepresentation. These causes of action are fact
sensitive, and therefore, proper disposition may not be
determined until adequate discovery has fleshed out the
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relevant facts.1 See, e.g., Drake v. Morris Plan Co. of
California, 53 Cal. App. 3d.208, 125 Cal. Rptr. 667, 670
(1975); Fikes v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Anchorage,
533 P.2d 251, 259-61 (Alaska 1975); Christiansen v. Philcent
Corp., 226 Pa. Super. 157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973).
It would be inappropriate for this court to rule that in no
circumstances and under no set of facts could Valley Mortgage,
as a construction lender, be held liable to Debrys as
subsequent purchasers of a project financed by Valley
Mortgage. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's
judgment and grant^ihe.DQbrys' leave to amend their complaint.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE COIJjajR:

Pamelajp. Greenwood, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1. In so stating, we do not suggest that Debry and their
counsel are free to make Valley Mortgage a defendant and hope
to turn up a claim against them in the course of discovery. On
the contrary, each claim in the amended pleading must be "well
grounded in fact,M as revealed by "reasonable inquiry," as well
as "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law . . . ."
Utah R. Civ. P. 11.
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THOMAS R. GRISLEY (3802)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Valley Mortgage Company
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL;
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL?
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.;
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a general
partnership; LEE ALLEN BARTEL;
SALMON & ALDER, INC.; WILLIAM
TRIGGER dba TRIGGER ROOFING;
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC, INC.; SCOTT
MCDONALD REALTY, INC.; STANLEY
POSTMA; TRI-K CONTRACTORS; KEN
BAR MANUFACTURING COMPANY;
GRANDEUR HOME BUILDERS
COMPONENTS; SOTER KNUDSEN; VAN
ELLSWORTH dba DRAFTING
UNLIMITED; CANADA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY; BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.;
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE CO.; MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY;
AMERICAN ASPHALT PAVING;
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY; J.F.
SMITH dba SMITH & JOHNSON LAND
& TITLE COMPANY; VALLEY
MORTGAGE CO.; UNITED BANK; THE
HARTFORD, CENTREX, INC.; AND
ZIONS LEASING COMPANY,

FINDINGS AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL OF VALLEY
MORTGAGE COMPANY

Civil No. C86-553
Judge Pat B. Brian

CASCADE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
DEL K. BARTEL and DALE THURGOOD,
Third-Party,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES,
HUISH & DEBRY, INC., DAVID M.
JORGENSEN, BRADFORD DEBRY,
STERLING GUSTAFSON, THOMPSON &
SONS HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING
COMPANY, INC., and JOHN DOES
1 THROUGH 50,
Third-Party
Defendants.

The motion to dismiss the causes of action set forth
against Valley Mortgage Company in DeBrys1 Fourth Amended Complaint came on for hearing on the 28th day of March, 1990 before
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Edward T. Wells, Robert DeBry &
Associates, appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs, Robert Debry
and Joan Debry, and Thomas R. Grisley, Parsons, Behle & Latimer,
appeared on behalf of the defendant, Valley Mortgage Company.
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel, and
having reviewed the contents of the file, and otherwise being
full

advised

under

the premises, hereby makes

findings and order:
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the

following

FINDINGS
1.
forth

In their Fourth Amended Complaint, DeBrys have set

three causes of action against Valley Mortgage.

Debrys

have alleged that Valley Mortgage:
(a)

Concealed facts (claim for concealment);

(b)

Misrepresented

(c)

Intentionally

facts

(negligent misrepresen-

tation; or
engaged

in

behavior

that

resulted in a detriment to the DeBrys (lender liability).
2.
ment,

the

With regard to the cause of action for conceal-

Court

finds

that

the Debrys

have

not

represented,

either in argument or in memorandum, that Valley Mortgage intentionally misrepresented

anything on which the DeBrys relied to

their detriment, or that Valley Mortgage fraudulently engaged in
any behavior which resulted in injury to the DeBrys.
3.

Under DeBrys' second cause of action for negligent

misrepresentation,

the Court specifically

been no representation

finds that there has

in argument, or upon facts set forth in

memorandum to substantiate that Valley Mortgage owed a duty to
the DeBrys.
4.

DeBrys1 third cause of action is based upon lender

liability predicated under the theory espoused by the California
court in Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan, et al., 447 P.2d
609 (Cal. 1968).
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5.

This Court specifically finds that the DeBrys have

not, and cannot, represent that Valley Mortgage engaged in any
type of activity or behavior, or conduct that would suggest that
the standards set forth in the Connor v. Great Western Savings &
Loan case should apply in the case before the Court.
6.

The Court further finds that the Connor v. Great

Western Savings & Loan case is a California case, and has not
been adopted by the state of Utah.
7.

If the Connor case standard were applied, however,

the Court specifically finds that there have been no representation or pleadings by the DeBrys that demonstrated that Valley
Mortgage was anything other than a standard lending institution
in the Cascade building project, and that the pleadings did not
allege

egregious,

outrageous

or

commercially

inappropriate

behavior by Valley Mortgage in its involvement with the Cascade
project.
ORDER
THEREFORE, based on the findings of the Court, all of
which are predicated on the allegations set forth in DeBrys1
Fourth Amended

Complaint, arguments by counsel orally and in

writing, and in the absence of any specific facts cited to the
Court by DeBrys to support the pleadings, the Court grants Valley

Mortgage's Motion to Dismiss all counts and allegations by the
DeBrys as set forth in their Fourth Amended Complaint.
ENTERED this

f

day of

/v^V^/

1990.

BY THE COURT:

/£Z.•-Ii'-V

DISTRICT cbURT "JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

EDWARD T. WELLS
Counsel for Plaintiffs

J,.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF VALLEY MORTGAGE COMPANY to the following on
thisc2£L_ day of maL.

1990:

Edward T. Wells
DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Murray, Utah 84107
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A34 22
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

;
i
|
|
|
l
)

ORDER CERTIFYING ORDER
GRANTING DISMISSAL OF
VALLEY BANK AS A FINAL
ORDER UNDER RULE 54(b) OF
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE

VALLEY MORTGAGE CO.,
i
)

Defendant.

The court
Valley Mortgage.

heretofore

Civil No. C86-553
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

granted

the Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff then moved the court for an* order

certifying the dismissal as a final judgment pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The matter was argued to the court on March 28, 1990,
at 2:30 p.m.

Thomas Grisley, Esq.f

appeared as counsel for

Valley Mortgage Co. and Edward T. Wells, Esq. appeared as counsel
for plaintiffs.
The parties having agreed that all rights of the said
parties were adjudged by the granting of said dismissal; and both
agreeing that Rule 54(b) certification was proper; and the court
finding expressly that there is no just reason for delay;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
order granting dismissal of Valley Mortgage Co. signed by the
court on May 7, 1989 be and hereby is designated as a final
judgment between the said parties pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this j ^

day of July, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

J-

c^L

PAT B. BRIAN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the
O
day of £u&*», 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER CERTIFYING ORDER GRANTING
DISMISSAL OF VALLEY BANK AS A FINAL ORDER UNDER RULE 54(B) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (DeBry v. Cascade, et al.) was
mailed, to the following:
Thomas Grisley
Roy G. Haslam
185 South State #700
SLC, UT 84111

-TZuAtlfai
rjd.vm/lk
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,

]

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
)

Civil No. C86-553

)

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

VALLEY MORTGAGE CO., et al.,
Defendants.
Notice is hereby given that Robert J. DeBry and Joan
DeBry, plaintiffs

herein named, hereby appeal to the Supreme

Court of the State of Utah from the order of the District Court
granting the motion of Valley Mortgage Co. to dismiss plaintiffs'
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure entered herein on May 2, 1990 and certified by the
District Court as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on May 2, 1990.
DATED this

day of May, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
copy of the foregoing
(DeBry v. Cascade, et al.) was mailed, on the

I certify that a true and correct
NOTICE OF APPEAL
^JZ

day of May, 1990, to the following:
Robert Hughes
Cascade Construction
c/o Del Bartel
50 West 300 South #1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
P.O. Box 7234
Murray, UT 84107
Randall L. Skeen
1245 East Brickyard Rd. #600
Cascade Enterprises
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
c/o Dale Thurgood
4455 South 700 East #300
Thomas Grisley
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Roy G. Haslam
185 South State #700
Del Bartel
Salt
Lake City, UT 84111
P.O. Box 7234
Murray, UT • 84107
D. Michael Nielsen
505 South Main Street
Dale Thurgood
Bountiful, UT 84010
4455 South 700 East #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Darwin C Hansen
136 South Main, Eighth Floor
Lee Allen Bartel
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
110 Merriraac Court
Vallejo, CA 94589
Craig Peterson
425 South 500 East
Glen Roberts
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
2677 Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Van Ellsworth
1414 Laburnum Street
Stanley Postma
McLean, VA 22101
257 1 South 7 5 West
Bountiful, UT 84010
Ken Bartel
12188 Clay Star Rd
Lynn McMurray
Herald, CA 95638
4 55 East 500 South #30
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,

;

Plaintiffs,

]

AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

;
)

Civil No. C86-553

vs.
VALLEY MORTGAGE CO., et al.,

)

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

Defendants.
Notice is hereby given that Robert J. DeBry and Joan
DeBry, plaintiffs herein named, hereby appeal to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah from the order of the District Court
granting the motion of Valley Mortgage Co. to dismiss plaintiffs'
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure entered herein on May 1,.

1990 and certified by the

District Court as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on May 7, 1990.
DATED this ^S / day of May, 1990.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL (DeBry v. Cascade, et al.) was mailed, on the
/
day of-4s$f 1990, to the following:
Robert Hughes
Cascade Construction
c/o Del Bartel
50 West 300 South #1000
P.O. Box 7234
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Murray, UT 84107
Randall L. Skeen
Cascade Enterprises
1245 East Brickyard Rd. #600
c/o Dale Thurgood
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
4455 South 700 East #300
Thomas Grisley
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Roy G. Haslam
185 South State #700
Del Bartel
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
P.O. Box 7234
Murray, UT• 84107
D. Michael Nielsen
Dale Thurgood
505 South Main Street
4455 South 700 East #300
Bountiful, UT 84010
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Darwin C. Hansen
Lee Allen Bartel
136 South Main, Eighth Floor
110 Merrimac Court
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Vallejo, CA 94589
Craig Peterson
Glen Roberts
425 South 500 East
2677 Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Van Ellsworth
Stanley Postma
1414 Laburnum Street
2571 South 75 West
McLean, VA 22101
Bountiful, UT 84010
Ken Bartel
Lynn McMurray
12188 Clay Star Rd
455 East 500 South #30
Herald, CA 95638
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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